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ABSTRACT:  This paper examines the roles of pegged exchange rate regime and capital 
account opening inducing persistent RER appreciation in the lead-up to the 1997 currency crisis 
in Thailand.  The three-sector (primary, manufacturing, and nontradable) economy-wide model is 
constructed and policy simulation experiments are undertaken.  Key findings are imposing capital 
control under a pegged exchange rate regime would have averted the persistent internal RER 
appreciation and boom in nontradable sector.   However, it would not have averted persistent 
external RER appreciation.  Exports and output would have eventually declined because of the 
capital shortage.  A freely floating regime only with a high developmental level of foreign 
exchange and financial markets would have been able to avert both persistent internal and 
external RERs appreciation.  The export and output would have eventually increased.  However, 
this regime would have generated fluctuations in domestic prices and output.  The managed 
floating regime (combined with inflation targeting) would have helped reduce such adverse 
effects while retaining the benefit from exchange rate flexibility.  In a context where the foreign 
exchange and financial markets are not well developed, capital control measures could be 
beneficial to ensure smooth functioning of a managed floating regime.   
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Exchange Rate Regimes, Capital Account Opening and the Real Exchange Rates: 
Evidence from Thailand 
 
1.  Introduction 
In the past decade, an increasing number of emerging-market economies have fallen victim to 
currency crises.  Notable examples include the Mexican crisis in 1994, the Asian crisis in 1997–
98, and the Argentine and Turkish crises at the dawn of the new millennium.  These events, 
which caused massive economic collapse in the affected countries with considerable global 
repercussions, have given rise to a large literature on the economic fundamentals that make 
countries vulnerable to currency crises.  
  The consensus emerging from this literature is that a persistent, significant appreciation 
of the real exchange rate (RER) is an integral part of economic preconditions that make a country 
vulnerable to currency crisis.1  There are two facets to the hypothesized link between RER 
appreciation and vulnerability.  First, a persistent real appreciation undermines the 
competitiveness of the tradable good sector, leading to a widening current account deficit and 
dwindling foreign exchange reserves.  The foreign reserve position (relative to accumulated 
foreign currency obligations) is a key determinant of a country’s ability to defend the exchange 
rate in face of rapid outflows of financial capital in anticipation of possible currency depreciation.  
Second, and related to the first point, under a pegged exchange rate regime, persistent RER 
appreciation acts as an important leading indicator of possible nominal exchange collapse 
following speculative capital outflows.  Such an appreciation implies that the authorities would be 
unable to defend the currency peg successfully in the event of speculative capital outflows, 
because domestic economic adjustment required to face the new lower (or negative) net capital 
inflows scenario cannot be accomplished through fiscal and monetary policies alone. 
 Despite this consensus, the underlying causes of persistent RER appreciation in the lead-
up to the recent currency crises remain a controversial issue.  Two common features of the 
macroeconomic policy of these countries, namely a prolonged adherence to a de facto pegged 
exchange rate regime and significant capital account opening, are central to the debate.  
  On the one hand, a number of authors argue that persistent RER appreciation mainly 
resulted from a wrong exchange rate regime choice, which was not consistent with an 
increasingly liberal capital account regime (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995; Summer, 1998; Mussa et 
al., 2000; Fischer, 2001).  In particular, Fischer (2001: p.10) argues that when a pegged regime 
                                                 
1  See for example Sachs et al. (1996), Dornbusch (1997), Goldstein (1998), Fischer (2001), 
Athukorala and Warr (2002), Schneider and Tornell (2004). 
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has been in place for some time, a belief gradually develops among market participants that the 
exchange rate will not change.  This removes perception of risk from foreign borrowing and 
encourages excessive short-term capital inflows, resulting in RER appreciation along with a 
boom in the nontradable sector.  The trade and current account balances tend to deteriorate.  A de 
facto pegged exchange rate regime invariably constrains the role of exchange rate adjustment in 
averting such adverse macroeconomic developments (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995).  The key 
inference of these studies is that a hard peg or a floating exchange rate regime would have 
avoided RER appreciation even in the context of significant capital account opening.  
On the other hand, some analysts emphasize the role played by capital account in RER 
appreciation (Reinhart and Smith, 2001; Stiglitz, 2001; Corden, 2002).  They argue that given 
massive short-term capital inflows triggered by capital account opening, RER appreciation was 
unavoidable, regardless of the nature of the exchange rate regime choice.  In particular, Corden 
(2002: p. 252) argues that  
 
‘… Inevitably, when there is a boom, there will be real appreciation 
irrespective of whether the exchange rate is fixed or flexible.  … There is 
little reason why a boom that is based on, or at least ends, in euphoria should 
not go on its merry way under a currency board or a floating regime as much 
as under a fixed-but-adjustable-regime.  For avoiding the adverse effect of a 
boom, exchange controls or taxes that discourage excessive short-term 
borrowing matter.’     
 
The massive short-term capital inflows under a floating regime induce RER appreciation 
through nominal exchange rate appreciation, particularly when the domestic economy is 
characterized by significant wage-price rigidity.  Under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
appreciation takes place through an increase in domestic nontradable prices.  Thus, an inference 
drawn from this viewpoint is that the surveillance of capital inflows, together with control of 
volatile short-term capital inflows, could have avoided excessive RER appreciation.  
This paper aims to address the debate on the roles of pegged exchange rate regime and 
capital account opening inducing persistent RER appreciation in the lead-up to the 1997 currency 
crisis through an in-depth case study of Thailand.  The methodology of this paper involves 
conducting simulation experiments of alternative policy scenarios using an economy-wide model 
constructed and estimated for the Thai economy.  The common practice in the literature in this 
subject area is to use a single RER index to represent both internal and external competitiveness.  
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This is not a satisfactory approach because the underlying assumption of the law of one price 
does not normally hold (Little et al., 1993).  The macroeconomic model developed in this paper 
explicitly delineates the internal RER, which measures the relative profitability of domestic 
tradable production vis-à-vis nontradable production, and the external RER, which measures the 
profitability of domestic tradable goods in the global context.  The use of an economy-wide 
model, instead of the single-equation approach, has the virtue of enabling us to incorporate 
interactions among various macroeconomic variables, and the dynamics involved in these 
relationships.  
Thailand provides an excellent case study of the subject at hand for three reasons.  Firstly, 
Thailand experienced persistent appreciation of internal and external RERs, from the late 1980s 
leading up to the 1997 currency crisis.2  Secondly, Thailand pursued a pegged exchange rate 
regime as well as accelerated capital account opening in the lead-up to the recent crisis.  The 
exchange rate during the period 1987–96 averaged out at around 25 baht per US dollar.  As well, 
Thailand commenced liberalizing controls of capital and financial account in the late 1980s.  
These two aspects of macroeconomic policy are widely cited as the main causes of the persistent 
RER appreciation and the currency crisis in Thailand (Alba et al., 1999; Lópex-Mejia, 1999; 
Warr, 1999; Rajan, 2001).  However, the relative importance of these two factors has not yet been 
examined.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The following section provides key 
features of the macroeconomic model.  The econometric procedure and the model performance 
are discussed in sections 3 and 4.  Section 5 presents the alternative simulation experiments.  
Discussion of the results is in section 6.  The final section summarizes the major findings and 
policy implications.  The macroeconomic model and the variable measurements are provided in 
Appendix I. 
 
2. Key Features of the Model 
The model is an extended version of the Salter-Swan framework where an economy consists of 
two types of goods — tradable and nontradable.  Tradable goods are further disaggregated into 
primary and manufactured goods.  This is done to allow for the different features, which vary 
                                                 
2 The magnitude of internal RER appreciations in 1996 was close to that in 1983, which led to a 
considerable devaluation and dramatic economic recession in 1984, while the average magnitude of 
external RER appreciation was far greater than that in 1983.  The persistent RER appreciation in the lead 
up to the 1997 crisis is referred to as RER misalignment (Jongwanich, 2002).         
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between the two sectors (Corbo, 1985).3  There are six main building blocks in the model, namely 
prices and wages, production capacity, aggregate demand, money market, external balance, and 
labour market. 
Following Corbo (1985), domestic output prices are derived from the weighted average 
of tradable ( PT ) and nontradable ( PN ) prices.  The nontradable price (Equation 1.3 in Appendix I) 
is determined according to the mark-up formulation in which the price is set as a mark-up on the 
cost of production.  The mark-up is hypothesized to depend on excess demand ( ED ).  Suppose 
that cost of production has two main components — wages adjusted by labour efficiency 
(W LP/ ), and imported raw material prices ( ePIMR
* ).  Thus, the nontradable price can be derived 
as a function of excess demand, wages adjusted by labour efficiency, and imported raw material 
prices.  For the tradable (primary and manufacturing) sector (Equations 1.1 and 1.2), prices are 
jointly determined by the law of one price and domestic condition factors (wage, excess demand 
and imported raw material price).  Including the domestic factors reflects the fact that some 
tradable goods could be differentiated from foreign competing goods.   
The wage (compensation per worker) in each sector (Equations 2.1–2.3) is determined by 
the inflation-augmented Phillips curve.4  With the assumption of labour mobility across sectors, 
the rate of change of nominal wage (adjusted by labour productivity) in each sector Δ W LP/b g  
can be expressed as a function of inflation expectations ( ΔPe ), and the deviation of total 
unemployment rate from the natural rate ( U U− * ).  Moreover, minimum wage ( MW ) is 
incorporated to capture the impact of the minimum wage setting by the government on the 
determinants of market wage.   
The production block (Equations 3.1–3.3) represents the supply side potential of the 
economy.  The (potential) output in each sector (Yi ) depends on trend of total factor productivity 
(TFP ), labour force (adjusted by the natural rate of unemployment) ( L ), capital stock ( K ), and 
land ( la ) (Giorno et al., 1995).  The production is linked to an aggregate demand through 
                                                 
3  Ideally, these two sectors should have been disaggregated further into exportables and 
importables, but this is not possible because of data limitations.  However, this is not considered to be a 
major limitation because there were no noticeable fluctuations in the terms of trade (in terms of both 
domestic and foreign currencies) in Thailand during the half decade prior to the crisis (the focus of the 
simulation experiments of this study) (McKibbin and Martin, 1998).  Therefore, exportables and 
importables can reasonably be assumed to be facing the same prices.  Tradables are treated as a composite 
commodity, comprised of exportables and importables. 
4 The non-linear model is also investigated but the unemployment rate becomes insignificant and 
does not perform well in terms of the standard diagnostic test. 
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changes in capital stock.  Hence, the potential output of the economy is endogenous to aggregate 
demand (in the short to medium run), rather than being exogenous. 
Aggregate demand is represented by the standard national account identity: summation of 
consumption ( C ), investment ( I ), government expenditure ( G ), exports ( X ), and imports 
( IM ).  Consumption is determined through a two-stage budgeting procedure.  At the first step, 
consumer decides how much income will be allocated to total consumption, based on the life 
cycle model (Equation 4.1).  That is, household aims to maximize the present value of lifetime 
utility subject to budget constraint, which is equal to current net worth plus the present value of 
expected income over the remaining working life of the agent.  The basic model is extended to 
incorporate demographic and distributional shifts (DEPEND), uncertainty of household income 
(UNCER), and liquidity (credit) constraint (PDCC).  The first variable is to capture the difference 
of marginal propensity to consume and wealth across all cohorts in an economy.  While child-
dependency and the retired generation have a higher marginal propensity to consume but a lower 
income than a working generation, an increase in the proportion of the former tends to increase 
aggregate consumption.  Uncertainty of household income and liquidity (credit) constraint can 
lead to a precautionary element in saving decisions so that aggregate consumption tends to be 
reduced within these situations.  The next step is to allocate aggregate consumption amongst the 
three goods (Equations 4.1.1–4.1.3).  The demand function is assumed to have constant elasticity 
in terms of its own price (Pi), income ( P CC ), and other goods prices (Pj).  The three crucial 
properties as postulated in consumer theory — adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry — are 
tested and imposed. 
Private investment (Equations 4.2.1–4.2.3) is based on an extended framework of the 
neoclassical investment model (Jorgenson, 1967).  With the price taker assumption in the factor 
market and with the Cobb-Douglas production function, (steady-state) investment can be derived 
as a positive relationship with the output level (Y ) and a negative relationship with the rental cost 
of capital ( CK ).  The basic model is extended to incorporate the fact that it takes time to plan, 
build, and install new equipment so that the gross domestic investment tends to adjust the 
difference between steady-state desired investment and investment in the previous period.  The 
response of private investment to the gap between steady-state and actual investment is assumed 
to vary systematically with three economic factors: (1) the availability of financing (PDCI), (2) 
the level of public sector investment (GI), and (3) the economic uncertainty condition (UNCER).5  
                                                 
5 These three well known economic factors in influencing private investment were widely 
incorporated in numerous studies (e.g. Blejer and Khan, 1984; Agénor, 2000).  
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The first two factors tend to reduce the gap between desired and actual investment, thereby 
increasing actual investment.  By contrast, the last factor is likely to enlarge this gap and reduce 
actual investment. 
Government expenditure ( G ) is decomposed into government investment ( GI ) and 
consumption ( GC ), which are treated as exogenous in the model (Equation 4.4).  Government 
consumption expenditure is treated solely as nontradable consumption.  
Budget constraints are imposed on the private and public sectors to ensure that the model 
is internally consistent (Equations 4.3 and 4.4.1).  Over and above the government budget 
constraint, the fiscal policy rule (Equation 4.4.2) is incorporated into the model to ensure that the 
intertemporal government budget constraint is satisfied, i.e. Debt T G ins S
s
s
0
0
1= − +∑
=
∞
( ) / b g  
where T is the tax revenue, G  is the government expenditure, and in  is the interest rate.  In 
other words, the value of debt in period 0 is equal to the future stream of tax revenue less the 
future stream of government spending (McKibbin, 1996).6 
Merchandise exports in primary and manufacturing (Equations 4.5.1 and 4.5.2) are 
modeled in terms of a reduced form equation derived from both demand and supply framework.  
The quantity of export is derived as a function of capacity output of an economy (Y ), the ratio of 
world prices (adjusted by exchange rate) to domestic prices ( eP P* / ), and foreign demand (YW ).  
The determinants of (merchandise) primary and manufacturing imports (Equations 4.6.1 and 
4.6.2) are based on the traditional specification of imports for a small open economy where the 
supply of imports is assumed to have infinite elasticity.  Thus, the quantity of imports in each 
sector is solely determined by the demand condition.  In other words, the quantity of imports is a 
function of domestic real income (Y) and the ratio of world (import) prices to domestic prices 
( eP P$ / ).   
Domestic interest rate (in) is determined by both demand for and supply of money.7  
Money supply (Equation 5.1) is determined through the money multiplier approach.  According 
to this approach, the money supply establishes the relationship with the money base through the 
                                                 
6  This means that in this study the government will introduce a lump sum tax ( T ) over and 
above personal income tax when interest costs of debts exceed the base case.  At the baseline, there is 
no lump sum tax.  Therefore, the steady state level of government debt depends on the steady state 
level of government spending. 
7 Note that when the monetary authorities are independent and allowed to conduct monetary 
policy through policy interest rate, e.g. under the inflation targeting framework, the domestic interest 
rate is changed to depend on the policy rate.  See details when a floating regime is incorporated within 
this core model. 
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multiplier.  The demand for money (Equation 5.2) is specified as a function of domestic interest 
rate, domestic output price, and real income.  Private domestic credit (Equation 5.3) is determined 
through the monetary identity to ensure that the money market is internally consistent.  The 
current account balance (Equation 6.1), net capital inflows (Equation 6.2), and items of net error 
and omissions yield the balance of payments identity (Equation 6.3) that will affect the money 
base through changes in foreign exchange reserves. 
Finally, the RER is separated into two concepts — internal and external RERs.  The 
internal RER refers to the relative prices of tradable to nontradable goods (Equation 1.4.1).  This 
measure reflects the incentives to allocate domestic resources across tradable and nontradable 
sectors.  When there is an increase in prices of the nontradable sector ( internal RER appreciates), 
resources tend to be geared towards this sector so that available resources for producing tradable 
products decline.  The external RER refers to the (geometric) trade-weighted average of tariff-
ridden world (tradable) prices adjusted by nominal exchange rate to domestic (tradable) prices 
(Equation 1.4.2).  When there is an increase in this index (real depreciation), domestic goods are 
relatively cheaper for foreigners.   
In this model, the long-run (steady-state) properties as well as homogeneity properties in 
each equation are imposed in the model.  Such long-run (steady-state) properties are needed to 
ensure that a set of structural economic relationships is constrained to be consistent with a neo-
classical steady state, in which the long-run output level is solely determined by supply-side 
factors, such as level of technology, and availability of factor inputs.  Aggregate demand (equals 
output) is equal to production capacity (i.e. potential output) and its equality is brought by the 
wage-price flexibility in the long run.  However, in the short run, the model exhibits the features 
of Keynesian-type economy, i.e. nominal wage-price stickiness and the demand determined 
economy.  These features are found in the model such as the MSG (McKibbin and Sachs, 1992); 
Multimode econometric model (Laxton et al., 1999); Vines and Warr (2003).    
 
3. Econometric Procedure 
The ‘general to specific’ (unrestricted dynamic) modelling procedure (Hendry et al., 1984) is the 
core methodology for estimating each behavioural equation (henceforth referred to GSM).8  The 
advantage of the GSM methodology is to be able to apply in terms of either the set of variables is 
non-stationary or a mixture of stationary and non-stationary series (Wickens and Breusch, 1988; 
                                                 
8 There are two exceptions.  First, the disaggregate private consumption equations are obtained by 
using a ‘seemingly unrelated regression equation (SUR)’ model in order to take into account the related 
error terms as well as to test and impose the adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry restrictions.  Secondly, 
the wage equation is determined by simple OLS estimation. 
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Pesaran et al., 2001).  Moreover, recent Monte Carlo studies revealed that in the case of finite 
sample, the GSM gives precise estimates and valid t-statistics, even in the presence of 
endogenous explanatory variables (Inder, 1993; Hendry, 1995).9 
The GSM procedure is to embed the relationship being investigated within a sufficiently 
complex dynamic specification, including lagged dependent and independent variables so that a 
parsimonious specification of the model can be uncovered.  Under this procedure, estimation 
begins with an autoregressive distribution lag (ADLs) specification of an appropriate lag order:  
Y AY B Xt i t i ij j t i t
i
m
j
k
i
m
= + + +− −
===
∑∑∑α μ,
011
     (3.1) 
where α  is a constant, Yt  is the endogenous variable, X j t,  is the jth  explanatory variable and 
Ai  and Bij  are the parameters.   
Equation (3.1) can be rearranged by subtracting Yt−1  on both sides and turns the set of 
explanatory variables in terms of differences representing the short-run dynamics.  The lagged 
levels of both dependent and explanatory variables are still left in the rearranged functional form 
on the right-hand-side in order to capture the long-run multiplier of the system. 
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 Equation (3.2) is known as the error correction mechanism (ECM) representation of the 
model.  This is the particular formulation generally used as the ‘maintained hypothesis’ of the 
specification search.  The estimation procedure involves first estimating the unrestricted equation 
(3.2), and then progressively simplifying it by restricting statistically insignificant coefficients to 
zero and reformulating the lag patterns where appropriate in terms of levels and differences to 
achieve orthogonality.   The long-run homogeneity can be tested and imposed in each equation.  
As part of the specification search, it is necessary to check rigorously at every stage even the 
                                                 
9 Even when all data series under consideration are non-stationary (I(1)), comparative Monte 
Carlo studies of cointegration technique find that this procedure is equally as good as the Phillips 
Hansen procedure in dealing with small data samples (Phillips and Loretan, 1991; Inder, 1993).  The 
Monte Carlo evidence also suggests that the Johansen estimation procedure, which is based on the full 
vector autoregression (VAR), deteriorates significantly in small samples, generating estimates with 
‘fat tails’ (frequent outliers) and sometimes substantial mean bias (Hargreaves, 1994).  Therefore, 
GSM is chosen for estimating the behavioural equations in this study.        
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more general of models for possible misspecification.  Such checks will involve both a visual 
examination of the residual from the fitted version of the model and the use of tests for serial 
correlation, heteroskedasticity and normality in the residual, and the appropriateness of the 
particular functional form used.  In particular, any suggestion of autocorrelation in the residual 
should lead to a rethink about the form of the general model.  Above all, theoretical consistency 
must be born in mind throughout the testing down procedure.  
 
4. The Model   
The model is estimated using annual data for Thailand over the period 1970–2002.  The full 
model — the estimated behavioural equations and identities — is presented in Appendix I.  All 
behavioural equations are theoretically sound in specification and pass the standard F-test for 
overall statistical significance.  They also pass the standard diagnostic test for serial correlation 
(DW and LM), heteroskedasticity (ARCH), normality in the residual (NORM), and functional 
form (RESET).  The DF test suggests that the residuals of the regressions have achieved 
stationarity. 10   However, the statistical acceptability and the theoretical reasonableness of 
individual equations do not necessarily imply that taken as a system the model will provide a 
faithful representation of the economic system.  Hence, examination of model performance is 
necessary.    
We apply two widely used methodologies to investigate performance of the model — 
historical simulation and standard diagnostic simulations.  The first methodology is to check the 
performance of overall model by comparing the original (observed) data series with the predicted 
series for each endogenous variable.  The latter series is given by the ‘base (historical) 
simulation’, which is obtained by simulating the model over the sample period.  To allow the lag 
response in each equation in the model, the simulation period is considered during 1977–2002.  
The second methodology is to apply three standard diagnostic simulation experiments — demand 
shock (a permanent increase in government consumption), supply shock (a permanent increase in 
technological progress in the tradable sector) and monetary shock (a permanent devaluation of 
nominal exchange rate).  
For the first methodology, performance of the model is summarized by two widely used 
statistical measures — the mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) and the Theil inequality 
coefficient.  The model performs quite well based on these two.  The Theil inequality 
                                                 
10  The standardized recursive residuals and recursive coefficients suggest the stability of estimates.  
In each equation, the Wu-Hausman is conducted to ensure that there is no evidence of simultaneity.  See 
details of the Wu-Hausman test within ADLs in Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, p. 201–03). 
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measurement is close to zero for all endogenous variables.  For almost all cases, the bias and 
variance proportions are small, which implies that the error of prediction is concentrated on 
covariance proportions.  Almost all variables tend to be associated with MAPE at less than ten 
per cent.  An examination of the observed and simulated series reveals that the direction of actual 
endogenous variables during the sample period is predicted well, particularly domestic prices and 
RERs.  In addition, three simulation experiments show simulation properties of the core model 
are theoretically reasonable (Appendix II).11 
There are two key points that reflect characteristics of the Thai economy.  Firstly, there 
are significant differences in the determinants of domestic prices in each sector.  For primary 
products, the tariff-ridden world price in terms of domestic currency is the crucial variable in 
determining the movement of the domestic primary price.  In the short run, demand pressure also 
affects the domestic primary price.  However, the law of one price holds for primary products in 
the long run.  In contrast, the law of one price does not hold for the manufacturing sector.  
Domestic cost can still influence firm’s decision-making when setting the manufacturing price.  
As expected, domestic factors dominate the movement of the nontradable price in both the short 
and long run.  In the long run, the homogeneity of degree one holds for domestic prices in all 
these three sectors.  With the evidence of price rigidity (the homogeneity of degree one does not 
hold for the short run), changes in nominal factors, such as nominal exchange rate, lead to short to 
medium-term changes in real variables, including internal and external RERs.   
Secondly, determinants of output and aggregate demand vary significantly among the 
three sectors, reflecting their different characteristics.  For example, capital accumulation is far 
more important in determining output in the manufacturing sector, compared to the primary and 
nontradable sectors, where production is relatively more labour-intensive.  Income elasticity of 
demand is greater for manufacturing and nontradable goods compared to primary goods.  The 
magnitude of income elasticity of demand for manufacturing imports is far greater compared to 
primary imports.  Thus, an identical shock would have different impacts on the three sectors.  
                                                 
11 A permanent increase in government consumption, which dominates in nontradable sector, 
would not have affected total output in the long run.  However, the structure of an economy would have 
been changed.  A share of the nontradable output would have enlarged whereas that in tradable sector 
contracted.  This would have made an adverse effect to trade balance.  Both internal and external RERs 
would have appreciated, compared with the historical base in the long run.  A permanent increase in 
technological progress in the tradable sector would have increased total output and exports in the long run.  
Tradable output would have increased more than nontradable output.  Even though internal RER would 
have exhibited appreciation, the external RER would have depreciated reflecting an increase in a country’s 
international competitiveness.  A permanent devaluation of nominal exchange rate would have increased 
output, particularly tradable output, only in the short run.  In the long run, the output and its structure would 
not have been affected.  It reflects the long-run neutrality when the nominal exchange rate had continuously 
maintained depreciation.     
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5. Simulation Experiments 
In order to probe into the roles of pegged exchange rate regime and capital account opening 
driving the persistent RERs appreciation in the lead-up to the 1997 currency crisis in Thailand, 
three key simulation experiments are undertaken during the period 1988–96.  The year 1988 is 
used as the starting point because it is the year when implementation of the financial 
liberalization program was commenced.  In addition, the period 1986–87 can be regarded as the 
period where the country to some extent attained the external balance.12  The year 1996 is used as 
the ending point because it is the year when the bust began with the collapse of export growth.  
The historical shocks are used during this period under the different exchange rate regimes and 
degrees of capital account opening. 
5.1 A Pegged Exchange Rate Regime with Capital (Inflows) Controls 
The main question addressed in this experiment is, if Thailand had imposed capital 
(inflows) control measures and reduced the amount of capital flows net of FDI (OCF$) given the 
existing pegged exchange rate regime, what would have happened to the internal and external 
RERs and other key variables in interest?  To answer this question, the capital control measures 
are introduced in the model in the form of risk for foreign investors ( )R  through equation OCF$ 
(Equation 6.2).   
Risk ( )R  is introduced in a manner that the levels of OCF$ between 1988 and 1996 were 
equal to the 1988 OCF$ level, i.e. US$2.7 billion (Figure 1).  Note that the simulation results are 
not significantly affected when altering the OCF$ level by using the 1989 and 1990 levels.  The 
OCF$ levels during the period 1991–95 are not appropriate because they were very high.  Setting 
high levels of OCF$ is unlikely to illustrate the effect of capital (inflows) controls. 
 
Figure 1:  The Net Other Form of Capital Flows ( OCF $ ) and Risk ( R )  
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12 The annual average of current account and balance of payment between 1986 and 1987 were 
US$-31 million and US$690 million, respectively.  These figures are far lower than those during the period 
1988–96, equaling US$-7,337 and US$3,880 million, respectively.   
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5.2 A Freely Floating Exchange Rate Regime with Capital Liberalization  
This experiment examines the impact on the internal and external RERs and other key 
macroeconomic variables when the Thai government had pursued a freely floating exchange rate 
regime with capital liberalization since 1988.  In a freely floating exchange rate regime, there is 
no direct intervention by the central bank to achieve the particular exchange rate target.  Thus, 
under this regime, exchange rate responds both to market force (especially expectations) and to 
monetary policy acting on interest rate (e.g. under inflation targeting framework) (Corden, 2002: 
p.23).  The country does not need to hold (much) foreign exchange reserves. 
To examine this scenario, three additional assumptions are needed.  Firstly, the exchange 
rate is determined according to the uncovered interest parity as in equation (5.1); 
 
in f i
E e e
e
riskt t t
t
= + −+FHG
I
KJ
* ,1         (5.1) 
where in  is the domestic interest rate, i* is the world interest rate, et is the nominal exchange rate 
at time t, E et t+1  represents the expected exchange rate at time t and risk is the country’s risk.13   
Given debate on the alternative approaches to the formulation of exchange rate 
expectations 14 , two alternative forms, namely the adaptive expectations (backward-looking 
expectations) and the combination of forward- and backward-looking expectations (henceforth 
referred to forward-looking expectations) are used.  Under the adaptive expectations, the expected 
exchange rate at period t ( E et t+1 ) is the weighted average between the exchange rate at time t (60 
per cent) and that at time t-1 (40 per cent).  The E et t+1 under the forward-looking expectations is 
the 40 per cent weight of exchange rate at time t+1 and the rest of the current rate.15  These two 
forms of expectations could be used to reflect the different developmental level of foreign 
exchange (and financial) market.  As argued by a number of studies (e.g. Krugman, 1993; Mussa, 
1993; Mussa et al., 2000), having a significant degree of forward-looking expectations in the 
exchange rate is not automatic.  Instead, it needs to have a well-functioning foreign exchange 
market and financial market efficiency.  Thus, the forward-looking expectations in exchange rate 
is used to reflect a case where Thailand would have had the significant degree of foreign 
                                                 
13 The country’s risk is calibrated to ensure that the uncovered interest parity is held during the 
period 1988–96.   
14  See for example Liu and Maddala (1992), and McCallum (1994). 
15 We found that when the weight associated with the current exchange rate is changed, there is no 
major change in the simulation results.   
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exchange (and financial) market efficiency when conducting a freely floating exchange rate 
regime.    
Secondly, changes in foreign exchange reserves are set at zero (ΔR$ = 0 ).  With the 
perfect capital mobility assumption (i.e. the coefficient associated with interest rate differentials 
in OCF$ equation becomes infinity), OCF$ is changed to ensure that the changes in foreign 
exchange reserves are equal to zero while the uncovered interest parity is held.    
Finally, following the 1997 crisis, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) adopted the inflation 
targeting framework as a new nominal anchor.  According to this framework, the central bank 
uses interest rate policy to influence the economy.  The Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) is used as 
guidance for conducting the monetary policy.  We apply this simple rule as a policy reaction 
function of monetary authorities in the model as follows16; 
 
i r y= + + ⋅ − + ⋅π ω π π ω1 2        (5.2)  
 
where i  is the policy interest rate, r is the (long-run) average real interest rate (= 4.5 per cent, an 
average of real interest rate during the period 1988–96), π is the inflation, π  represented the 
targeted inflation (= 2.5 per cent), y is the deviation of output from the potential one, and ω1 and 
ω 2  are the coefficients associated with the inflation and output (0.6:0.4).17  Note that within this 
monetary policy framework, the mechanism in the money market block is changed from the core 
macroeconomic model.  In this scenario, changes in policy interest rate will affect the domestic 
interest rate in the core macroeconomic model.  Changes in domestic interest rate affect money 
demand while money supply under this regime is endogenised to equal to money demand.  
   
 
 
                                                 
16  When there is credible inflation targeting, it provides a nominal anchor for inflation 
expectations (de Brouwer and O’Regan, 1997; Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003).  This point is examined 
by assuming that inflation expectations (in wage equations (Equations 2.1–2.3)) had equaled the inflation 
target (2.5 per cent) rather than lagged inflation as in the core model.  The results of key variables, 
especially RERs are more or less comparable.  In addition, we also examine the result when the forecast 
inflation is used in equation (6.6) rather than the contemporaneous value.  The result is not significantly 
affected.  However, the variation of inflation under the forward-looking rule tends to be slightly less than 
that under the contemporaneous rule.  This result is consistent with earlier studies (e.g. de Brouwer and 
O’Regan, 1997; Debelle and Wilkinson, 2002). 
17  The interbank rate (Inter) is used as a policy rate.  The target set at 2.5 per cent is the mid point 
between 0 and 5 percent (the average rate during the period 1970–96).  The coefficients associated with the 
inflation (from target) and output (from its potential) are consistent with the simple regression to determine 
the weight between inflation (from target) and output gap after the crisis.  The coefficient is also consistent 
with interviewing high-profile staff from the BOT. 
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5.3 A Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regime  
As argued by a number of empirical studies, many countries, especially developing 
countries, are reluctant to pursue a freely floating exchange rate regime because this regime might 
result in volatility in key macroeconomic variables.  The last scenario takes into account this 
concern.  We suppose Thailand had pursued a managed floating exchange rate regime. 
The managed floating exchange rate regime is referred to as the situation where the 
monetary authorities adjust interest rate policy and/or intervene in the foreign exchange market to 
deliberately affect the exchange rate without a particular commitment (Corden, 2002).  The main 
objectives of the intervention under this regime are to moderate exchange rate movements and to 
ensure that the price of domestic tradable goods reflects a realistic and stable incentive for the 
private sector (Krueger and Chinoy, 2004: p.61).  A nominal anchor such as inflation targeting 
often accompanies this regime while the central bank tends to collect some foreign exchange 
reserves. 
To examine this scenario, three additional assumptions are needed.  First, it is assumed 
that the exchange rate is determined by the uncovered interest parity with two alternatives of 
exchange rate expectations as in the previous scenario.  
Second, instead of assuming no change in foreign exchange reserves, it is assumed that 
the BOT aims to accumulate foreign exchange reserves during a time of capital inflows.  Here we 
arbitrarily assume that the annual changes in foreign exchange reserves are equal to the 1988 
level, i.e. US$2.1 billion (ΔR$ .= 21).18  Within this regime, OCF$ is changed to ensure that the 
change in foreign exchange reserves is equal to US$2.1 billion while uncovered interest parity is 
maintained.  
Finally, the policy rule as in equation (5.2) is modified as in equation (5.3).  Equation 
(5.3) assumes the Thai government is concerned about the movement of exchange rate and the 
effect of exchange rate changes on international competitiveness (as argued by Krueger and 
Chinoy, 2004: p.61).  Hence, the third objective is introduced into the policy rule that the central 
bank tends to maintain the level of external RER close to the average level between 1986 and 
1987 ( RERT
external ) where the country attained the external balance (see footnote 12 above).  We 
arbitrarily set the coefficient associated with the external RER target to equal 0.4, which equals to 
                                                 
18  Nevertheless, the simulation results are not significantly affected when altering the 
predetermined levels by using 1989 and 1990 levels.  The change in reserve levels during the period 
1991–95 is not appropriate because it was the period where there were massive increases in foreign 
exchange reserves. 
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the coefficient of output gap.  This modified form of policy rule is widely used in the context of a 
small open economy (e.g. de Brouwer and O’Regan, 1997; Ball, 1998).   
 
i r y RER RERexternal T
external= + + ⋅ − + ⋅ + −π ω π π ω ω1 2 3     (5.3)  
 
As argued by Corden (2002: p.69), a managed floating exchange rate regime could be 
associated with and without capital control measures.  Nevertheless, the theoretical underpinning 
of the co-existence between a managed floating regime and capital controls is not fully coherent.  
Hence, this study runs the simulation experiment of this scenario with and without capital 
controls.  With a capital control alternative, it is arbitrarily assumed that the country’s risk is 
increased by three percentage points from the historical base level, i.e. risk/100 + 0.03.19 
 
6. Simulation Results 
6.1 A Pegged Exchange Rate Regime with Capital Controls 
Capital controls affect RERs through adjustment of the economy to the capital shortage.  The 
capital shortage from introducing capital controls would have led to an increase in domestic 
interest rate and a decline in private domestic credit.  As a result, output would have continuously 
dropped, compared to the historical base (Figure 2(A)).  Among the three sectors, nontradable 
output would have been reduced with greater magnitude than tradable (primary and 
manufacturing) output.  The less output contraction in tradable sector than nontradable sector 
would have resulted from a reduction of imports that helped to mitigate reduction in other 
components of aggregate demand, particularly investment.  The capital controls would also have 
helped to allocate resources from nontradable to tradable sectors.  Such benefits would have 
offset the negative effects of capital shortage.  In particular, the primary sector, which is labour-
intensive, would have experienced output expansion as a result of imposing capital controls 
(Figure 2(A)). 
Different patterns of domestic demand changes for the three sectors would have had an 
impact on domestic prices.  The directional impacts would have been clear in the primary and 
nontradable sectors.  That is, the price of primary products would have increased from the 
historical base, whereas that of nontradable products would have decreased (Figure 2(C)).  Where 
                                                 
19 The increased risk assumption is based on the findings of the World Bank (cited in McKibbin 
and Martin, 1998: p.14–5).  They argue that the risk premium, measured by the comparison of internal rate 
of return on Thai government bonds (10 years) with that on US bonds of similar maturity, increased from 
around 0.9 per cent before the crisis to a peak of about 4.5 per cent after the crisis.  Hence, risk/100, which 
was on average around 1.5 per cent, is increased by 3 per cent to reach the risk premium at 4.5 per cent.       
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the manufacturing sector is concerned, its nature of capital intensity would have led to a larger 
scale reduction in production capacity than in demand during the period 1992–96.  This would 
have enlarged excess demand in the manufacturing sector so that the manufacturing price would 
have increased from the historical base.  As a result, the internal RER would have significantly 
depreciated, compared with the historical base, while the external RER would have appreciated 
(Figure 2(D)).  This implies that capital controls would have helped avoid the persistent internal 
RER appreciation and reduced the boom in the nontradable sector.  However, this policy choice 
would have jeopardized the country’s international competitiveness, thereby hindering an 
improvement in exports and economic growth overall. 
 The capital controls would have reduced the current account deficit significantly (Figure 
2(F)).  The lower income level would have caused a reduction in imports.  Even though there 
would have been a negative effect on exports from the reduction in investment and production 
capacity, its magnitude of reduction tends to smaller than the reduction in imports.  Besides, the 
lower level of OCF$ would have reduced the interest payments. 
Figure 2:  Key Variables under a Pegged Exchange Rate Regime with Capital Controls 
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6.2 A Freely Floating Exchange Rate Regime with Capital Liberalization 
6.2.1 Backward-looking Exchange Rate Expectations 
Had Thailand pursued a freely floating regime with backward-looking expectations since 
1988, the nominal exchange rate would have continuously appreciated (Figure 3(A)).  Such 
directional change of the exchange rate during this period would have been dominated by the 
presence of net capital inflows.  As a result, both internal and external RERs would have 
appreciated from the historical base throughout the simulation period (Figure 3(E)).  The 
appreciation of internal RER would have come from the appreciation of the nominal exchange 
rate and the different degree of exchange rate pass-through into domestic prices.  Where the latter 
is concerned, the degree is the smallest in the nontradable sector and the largest in the primary 
sector.  The external RER appreciation would have resulted from the imperfect degree of 
exchange rate pass-through in tradable prices.  Such RERs appreciation would have led to 
reduction in exports that further reduced other components of aggregate demand (Figure 3(D)). 
As a result, primary and manufacturing output would have reduced from the historical 
base (Figure 3(C)).  It would have negatively affected demand for nontradable output.  However, 
the internal RER appreciation would have reflected that domestic resources were still allocated in 
favour of the nontradable sector.  Thus, the reduction of nontradable output would have been less 
than that of tradable one.  With the reduction in both tradable and nontradable output, the GDP 
level would have been lower from the historical base. 
The current account balance would have been improved in spite of currency appreciation 
(Figure 3(F)).  Even though export volume would have declined from currency appreciation, 
import volume would have been restrained as a result of the negative income effect from the 
overall economic slowdown.  While the import price was higher than the export price during the 
simulation period, the decline in import value would have been greater than that in export value.  
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Thus, the trade balance would have improved from the currency appreciation.20  In addition, the 
short-term capital flows ( OCF$ ) would have reduced from the historical base, thereby improving 
the service account balance.   
All in all, if Thailand had pursued a freely floating exchange rate under a circumstance 
where private agents form their currency expectations adaptively, the persistent appreciation of 
both internal and external RERs would not have been averted.  The resources would still have 
been relatively concentrated in the nontradable sector while exports and output would have been 
lower than the historical base.  The current account improvement would have mainly come from 
the reduction in income (i.e. overall economic slowdown) rather than an improvement in 
country’s competitiveness. 
 
Figure 3: Key Variables under a Freely Floating Exchange Rate Regime with Adaptive Expectations 
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20 The J-curve phenomenon in Thailand is also found in Vines and Warr (2003).   
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6.2.2 Forward-looking Exchange Rate Expectations 
In this sub scenario, economic agents form their expectations of future exchange rate by 
looking forward to what the exchange rate would be in the following period rather than solely 
relying on the historical data.21  When economic agents change the expectations, the major impact 
is on exchange rate movements.  When the exchange rate exhibits a downward trend (i.e. 
e e et t t− +≥ ≥1 1 ), the forward looking expectations would result in a greater degree of appreciation.  
When the exchange rate in the following period would be further expected to appreciate as 
happened during the period 1988–94, the cost of foreign borrowing would become lower for 
agents with the forward-looking expectations than the backward-looking ones.  All other things 
being equal, this would induce more capital inflows, exerting pressure on the currency to 
appreciate.  The same rationale could be applied to explain when the exchange rate exhibits an 
upward trend (i.e. e e et t t− +≤ ≤1 1 ) as occurred in 1995–96 (Figure 3(A)). 
The effect of changing the expectation formulation on the exchange rate would have had 
considerable influence on the pattern and magnitude of key economic variables.  Comparing with 
Scenario 6.2.1 (backward-looking expectations), the turning point where the degree of internal 
RER appreciation would have declined, compared to the historical base would have been reached 
more quickly in this sub scenario than in the previous sub scenario (Figures 4(C) and 3(E)).  This 
turning point implies that the incentive to allocate resources into the nontradable sector would 
have declined, compared with the previous period.  From 1990 onwards, more resources would 
have been geared toward tradable sector, and the persistent internal RER appreciation would have 
been avoided.  This implies that a freely floating exchange rate regime with a certain degree of 
forward-looking expectations would have slowed down the boom in the nontradable sector faster 
                                                 
21  This study applies a model consistent expectations method in solving the future value of 
nominal exchange rate.  To allow the adjustment of nominal exchange rate, we solved the model until 2002 
(i.e. the forecasted value of year 2002 was used as the terminal condition for solving the forward-looking 
expectations).  Note that when the year 1997 or 2000 was used as the terminal condition, the results are still 
comparable.    
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than that under the adaptive expectations.  As well, compared to Scenario 6.2.1 (backward-
looking expectations), the magnitude of external RER appreciation under this sub scenario would 
have been greater and less during the period 1988–93 and 1994–96, respectively (Figures 4(C) 
and 3(E)).  In 1995–96, the external RER under this sub scenario would have been depreciated 
from the historical base by 3.9 and 12.0 per cent, respectively.   
Consistent with the pattern and magnitude of RERs, the level of total output would have 
first contracted from the historical base.  However, during the period 1995–96, the output would 
have been higher than the historical base by 0.5 per cent and 10.3 per cent, respectively (Figure 
4(A)).  The tradable output, especially manufacturing output, would have been a key contributor 
to overall output expansion during the last two years.  This result would have contrasted with 
Scenario 6.2.1 (backward-looking expectations) where output would have declined from the 
historical base throughout the simulation period.  
A comparison between these two alternative forms of expectations for private agents 
indicates that the persistent RERs appreciation would have been averted when economic agents 
were forward looking to what the exchange rate would be in the following period, rather than 
relying solely on historical data.  The nontradable boom would have been avoided, resources 
would have been relatively geared more towards tradables, and exports would have been higher, 
compared to the historical base (Figures 4(B) and (D)).  In other words, the stage of development 
in the foreign exchange market is the key factor in determining how fast the market mechanism 
works.  However, having forward-looking expectations would have led to a greater degree of 
fluctuations in key variables, e.g. RERs, GDP, and domestic prices that would call for concern.  
For example, the variance of total output and price changes in the forward-looking manner would 
have been 39.4 and 69 per cent of the historical base, respectively, compared to 1.8 and 51 in the 
backward-looking expectations. 
 
Figure 4: Key Variables under a Freely Floating Regime with Forward-looking Expectations 
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6.3 A Managed Floating Exchange Rate Regime 
6.3.1 Backward-looking Expectations without Capital Controls 
The major departure of simulation outcomes between this scenario and Scenario 6.2.1 
(the freely floating regime) is that both internal and external RERs would still have appreciated 
from the historical base, but magnitude of such appreciations would have been lower than that in 
Scenario 6.2.1 (Figures 5(E) and (F)).  This would have mainly come from a lower magnitude of 
nominal exchange rate appreciation, because under the managed floating regime, the monetary 
authorities would have been allowed to intervene in the foreign exchange market to attain positive 
reserve changes.  Besides, the monetary authorities would have been allowed to use the nominal 
interest rate to influence the movement of exchange rate to attain the external RER target.  Since 
there would not have been any major difference in the impact on internal and external RERs 
between the freely floating and managed floating regimes except the lower magnitude under the 
latter, the directional impact on other macroeconomic factors would have been more or less the 
same.  However, magnitudes of changes in these variables would have been lower than those 
under scenario 6.2.1 (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Key Comparisons among a Freely Floating (F), Managed Floating without capital controls 
(MF) and Managed Floating with control (MFC) (Backward-looking Expectations) 
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6.3.2 Backward-looking Expectations with Capital Controls 
Imposing capital control measures, i.e. increases in the risk for foreign investors, would 
have lowered the dollar value of OCF$ level by 7.0 per cent, compared to that under Scenario 
6.3.1.  The exchange rate under this scenario would have become less appreciated than that under 
Scenario 3.1 (Figure 5(A)).  Meanwhile, the capital controls would have increased the domestic 
interest rate as a result of capital shortage (Figure 5(B)).  However, the positive effect of output 
under this scenario compared to that under Scenario 6.3.1 (Figure 5(C)) would have reflected that 
a positive effect of currency depreciation tended to dominate the negative effect from interest rate 
increase.  The internal and external RERs would have been less appreciated, compared to those 
in scenario 6.3.1 (Figures 5(E) and (F)). 
All in all, the managed floating regime with capital controls would have increased the 
effectiveness in avoiding the persistent RERs appreciation compared to the managed floating 
regime per se when economic agents form expectations of the future exchange rate adaptively.  
The relative boom in the nontradable sector would have reduced while exports and output would 
have increased from the historical base, particularly in 1995–96.  
6.3.3 Forward-looking Expectations without Capital Controls 
Compared to Scenario 6.2.2 (the freely floating regime), the degree of exchange rate 
appreciation under the managed floating regime would have been lower (Figure 6(A)).  Hence, 
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both internal and external RERs would have appreciated by a lesser magnitude than those under 
Scenario 6.2.2 (Figure 6(F)).  This would have been an exception in 1995–96 due to the presence 
of external RER target in the policy rule.  The external RER in these two years would have 
tended to be greater than the target level (i.e. the 1988 external RER) when pursuing the freely 
floating regime.  Thus, the policy rule under the managed floating regime would have slowed 
down changes in nominal exchange rate through an adjustment of nominal interest rate.  The 
exchange rate in this scenario would have depreciated from the previous period less than what 
would have been in Scenario 6.2.2.  In 1995–96, the nominal exchange rate under this sub-
scenario would have depreciated from the previous period by 8.8 per cent, compared to 12.9 per 
cent in Scenario 6.2.2.  The implication of the slowdown changes in exchange rate is the 
fluctuations of key economic variables would have been reduced, while retaining the benefits 
from allowing nominal exchange rate to be flexible.  The variance of output and prices changes as 
a per cent of the historical base would have been 14.1 and 20.2, respectively, compared to 39.4 
and 69 in Scenario 6.2.2.  Share of tradable output would have increased from the historical base 
since 1990, particularly in 1995–96.  Export would have been increased from the historical base, 
clearly noticed in 1995–96.  In addition, the export and output loss in the first few years of 
pursuing this regime would have been significantly less than the freely floating regime (Figures 
6(C) and (B)). 
 
Figure 6: Key Comparisons among a Freely Floating (F), Managed Floating without capital controls 
(MF) and Managed Floating with controls (MFC) (Forward-looking Expectations) 
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6.3.4 Forward-looking Expectations with Capital Controls 
The imposition of capital controls, which results in an increase in the country’s risk for 
foreign investors, would have lowered the dollar value of OCF$ by 6 per cent, compared to that 
under Scenario 6.3.3.22  As a result, the nominal exchange rate and interest rate in this scenario 
would have been higher than those in Scenario 6.3.3 (Figures 6(A) and (B)).  Because of the 
greater degree of currency depreciation, the internal and external RERs would have depreciated 
relatively more than those in scenario 6.3.3 (Figures 6(E) and (F)).  Interestingly, during the 
period 1995–96 when the exchange rate would have considerably depreciated, imposing capital 
controls over and above the managed floating regime would have created a negative effect on 
RERs and other key variables.  Since the managed floating regime with forward-looking 
expectations would have resulted in considerably currency depreciation, imposing capital controls 
would have become less necessary.  Even though the exchange rate would have further 
                                                 
22 The percentage reduction of OCF$ between Scenario 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 (forward-looking 
expectations) is lower than that between Scenario 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 (backward-looking 
expectations).  This implies that, with the same increased level of the country’s risk, the 
effectiveness of capital controls under forward-looking expectations would have been less than 
that under backward-looking expectations. 
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depreciated after imposing capital controls, there would have been an increase in excess demand 
(i.e. demand would have grown faster than capacity), and a considerable increase in domestic 
prices in both tradable and nontradable goods.  As a result, in 1996, the external RER in this 
scenario would have appreciated more, compared to that in scenario 6.3.3 (Figure 6(F)).  As well, 
there would not have been a difference in the internal RER between these two sub-scenarios 
(Figure 6(E)).  Hence, the positive effect on output would have been reduced.  Deviation from the 
historical base would have been more or less the same between scenarios 6.3.3 (no capital 
controls) and 6.3.4 (capital controls). 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the roles of pegged exchange rate regime and capital account opening in 
driving the persistent real exchange rates (RERs) appreciation in the lead-up to the 1997 currency 
crisis through an in-dept case study of Thailand.  Three key policy simulation experiments are 
undertaken during the period 1988–96 through the macroeconomic model.  The three simulations 
are composed of the imposition of capital controls under a pegged exchange rate regime, a freely 
floating exchange rate regime with capital liberalization (combined with inflation targeting as a 
new nominal anchor) and a managed floating exchange rate regime with and without capital 
control (combined with inflation targeting). 
We found that capital control under a pegged exchange rate would have rectified the 
persistent internal RER appreciation and boom in nontradable sector.  However, it would not 
have averted persistent external RER appreciation.  Exports and output would have eventually 
declined because of the capital shortages.  By contrast, the freely floating exchange rate regime 
only with a high developmental level of foreign exchange (and financial) market would have been 
able to rectify both persistent internal and external RERs appreciation, particularly during the 
period 1995–96.  Exports and output would have eventually increased, particularly in 1995–96.  
However, it would have generated output and prices fluctuations.  The managed floating regime, 
in which the monetary authorities have a view on the desired level and path of the real and 
nominal exchange rate, would have helped reduce these adverse effects while retaining the 
benefit from exchange rate flexibility.  When the foreign exchange and financial markets are still 
not well developed as in Thailand, capital control measures could be beneficial to ensure smooth 
functioning of a managed floating regime.  However, the need for capital control measures 
diminishes when the country’s foreign exchange and financial markets gain maturity. 
 26
References 
Agénor, P.R. (2000), The Economics of Adjustment and Growth, Academic Press, California. 
Agénor, P.R. and A.W. Hoffmaister (1998), ‘Capital Inflows and the Real Exchange Rate: Analytical 
Framework and Econometric Evidence’, in R. Glick (ed.), Managing Capital Flows and 
Exchange Rates: Perspectives from the Pacific Basin, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Alba, P., L. Hernandez and D. Klingebiel (1999), ‘Financial Liberalization and the Capital Account: 
Thailand 1988–1997’, The World Bank, Washington, DC, mimeo. 
Athukorala, P. and P.G. Warr (2002), ‘Vulnerability to a Currency Crisis: Lessons from the Asian 
Experience’, World Economy, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 33–57. 
Ball, L. (1998), ‘Policy Rules for Open Economies,’ Research Discussion Paper No. 9806, Economic 
Research Department, Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Blejer, M.I. and M.S. Khan (1984), ‘Government Policy and Private Investment in Developing 
Countries,’ IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 379–403, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.  
Calvo, G.A. and C.M. Reinhart (2002), ‘Fear of Floating’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, 
No. 2, pp. 379–408.  
Corbo, V. (1985), ‘International Prices, Wages and Inflation in an Open Economy: A Chilean Model,’ 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, No. 4, pp. 564–573.  
Corbo, V. (2002), ‘Exchange Rate Regimes in the Americas: Is Dollarization the Solution?’, IMES 
Discussion Paper No. 2002-E-18, Institute For Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of 
Japan, Japan. 
Corbo, V. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2003), ‘Inflation Targeting: The Latin America Experience’, in J.A. 
González., V. Corbo., A. Krueger and A. Tornell (eds.), Latin American Macroeconomic 
Reforms: The Second Stage, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Corden, W.M. (2002), Too Sensational: On the Choice of Exchange Rate Regime, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Debelle, G. and J. Wilkinson (2002), ‘Inflation Targeting and the Inflation Process: Some Lessons 
from an Open Economy’, Research Discussion Paper No. 2002–01, Economic Research 
Department, Reserve Bank of Australia. 
de Brouwer, G. and J. O’Regan (1997), ‘Evaluating Simple Monetary-policy Rules for Australia’, in P. 
Lowe (ed.), Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
Conference at the H.C. Coombs Centre for Financial Studies, Kirribilli, July 21 and 21. 
Dornbusch, R. (1997), ‘A Thai-Mexico Primer: Lessons for Outmaneuvering a Financial Meltdown’, 
The International Economy, Vol. 11, No. 5, pp. 20–23. 
Edwards, S. (1999), ‘On Crisis Prevention: Lesson from Mexico and East Asian’, NBER Working 
Paper 7233, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
Fischer, S. (2001), ‘Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 3–24. 
Giorno, C., P. Richardson., D. Roseveare and P. van den Noord (1995), ‘Potential Output Gaps and 
Structural Budget Balances’, OECD Economic Studies, Vol. 24, pp. 167–209. 
Goldstein, M. (1998), The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Cures, and Systemic Implications, Institute 
for International Economics, Washington, DC. 
Hargreaves, C. (1994), ‘A Review of Methods of Estimating Cointegrating Relationships’, in C. 
Hargreaves (ed.), Nonstationary Time Series Analysis and Cointegration, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.  
Hendry, D.F. (1995), Dynamic Econometrics, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Hendry, D.F., A. Pagan and J.D. Sargan (1984), ‘Dynamic Specification’, in Z. Griliches and M.D. 
Intriligator (eds.), The Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. II, North-Holland, Amsterdam. 
Hernández, L. and P. Montiel (2001), ‘Post-Crisis Exchange Rate Policy in Five Asian Countries: 
Filling in the Hollow Middle’, IMF Working paper WP/01/170, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, DC.  
 27
Inder, B. (1993), ‘Estimating Long-Run Relationship in economics’, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 57, 
No. 1-3, pp. 53–68. 
Jorgenson, D.W. (1967), ‘The Theory of Investment Behaviour’, in R. Ferber (ed.), Determinants of 
Investment Behaviour, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York. 
Jongwanich, J. (2002), ‘Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation and Currency Crisis: Evidence from 
Thailand’, The Australian National University, mimeo.  (Forthcoming in Applied Economics)  
Krueger, A. and S. Chinoy (2004), ‘Indian Exchange Rate Policy’, in A. Krueger and S. Chinoy (eds.), 
Reforming India’s External, Financial, and Fiscal Policies, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi. 
Krugman, P. (1993), ‘Recent Thinking About Exchange Rate Determination Policy’, in P. Lowe (ed.), 
Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting, the Reserve Bank of Australia Conference at the 
H.C. Coombs Centre for Financial Studies, Kirribilli, July 21 and 21. 
Laxton, D., P. Isard., H. Faruqee., E. Prasad and B. Turtelboom (1999), MULTIMOD mark III: the 
Core Dynamic and Steady-State Models, Occasional Paper No. 164, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC. 
Little, I.M.D., R. Cooper, W.M. Corden and S. Rajapatirana (1993), Boom, Crisis, and Adjustment: 
the Macroeconomic Experience of Developing Countries, Oxford University Press, 
Washington, DC. 
Liu, P.C. and G.S. Maddala (1992), ‘Rationality of Survey Data and Tests for Market Efficiency in the 
Foreign Exchange Markets’, Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 
366–381. 
Lopez-Mejia, A. (1999), ‘Large Capital Flows: Causes, Consequences and Policy Responses’, 
Finance and Development, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 28–31. 
McCallum, B.T. (1994), ‘A Reconsideration of the Uncovered Interest Parity Relationship’, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 105–132. 
McKibbin, W.J. (1996), ‘Disinflation, Fiscal Consolidation and the Role of Monetary and Fiscal 
Regimes’, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Workshop on Monetary Policy held at Wellington, 
May 20 and 21. 
McKibbin, W. and J. Sachs (1992), Global Linkages, Brooking Institution, Washington, DC.   
McKibbin, W.J and W. Martin. (1998), ‘The East Asian Crisis: Investigating Causes and Policy 
Responses’, Working Papers in Trade and Development No. 98/6, Division of Economics, 
The Australian National University, Canberra.  
McKinnon, I. (2001), ‘After the Crisis, the East Asian Dollar Standard Resurrected: An Interpretation 
of High-Frequency Exchange Rate Pegging’, in J.E. Stiglitz and S. Yusuf (eds.), Rethinking 
the East Asian Miracle, Oxford University Press, New York.  
Mussa, M. (1993), ‘Recent Thinking About Exchange Rate Determination Policy: Discussion’, in P. 
Lowe (ed.), Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
Conference at the H.C. Coombs Centre for Financial Studies, Kirribilli, July 21 and 21. 
Mussa, M., P. Masson., E. Jadresic., P. Mauro and A. Berg (2000), Exchange Rate Regimes in an 
Increasing Integrated World Economy, Occasional Paper No. 193, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, DC.  
Obstfeld, M. and K. Rogoff (1995), ‘The Mirage of Fixed Exchange Rates’, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 75–96. 
Pesaran, M.H. and B. Pesaran (1997), Working with Microfit 4.0: Interactive Econometric Analysis, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Pesaran, M.H., Y. Shin., and R.J. Smith. (2001), ‘Bounds Testing Approaches to the Analysis of Long 
Run Relationships’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 289–326. 
Phillips, P.C.B. and M. Loretan (1991), ‘Estimating Long Run Equilibria’, Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 407–436. 
Rajan, R.S. (2001), ‘(IR)Relevance of Currency-Crisis Theory to the Devaluation and Collapse of the 
Thai Baht’, Princeton Studies in International Economics No. 88, Princeton University.  
Reinhart, C.M. and R.T. Smith (2001), ‘Temporary Controls on Capital Inflows’, NBER Working 
Paper 8422, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge.  
 28
Sachs, J.D., A. Tornell and A. Velasco (1996), ‘Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lesson 
from 1995’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1996, No. 1, pp. 147–215. 
Schneider, M. and A. Tornell. (2004), ‘Balance Sheet Effects, Bailout Guarantees and Financial 
Crises’, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 71, No. 3, pp. 883–913. 
Stiglitz, J. (2001), ‘Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Small Open Economy: The Case of 
Iceland,’ Working Paper No. 15, Central Bank of Iceland, Iceland. 
Summers, L. (1998), ‘Go with the Flow’, Financial Times, March 11.  
Taylor, J.B. (1993), ‘Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice’, Carnegie-Rochester Conference 
Series on Public Policy, Vol. 39, pp. 195–214. 
Vines, D. and P.G. Warr (2003), ‘Thailand’s Investment-Driven Boom and Crisis’, Oxford Economic 
Papers, Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 440–466. 
Warr, P.G. (1999), ‘What Happened to Thailand?’, World Economy, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 631–650.  
Wickens, M.R. and T.S. Breusch (1988), ‘Dynamic Specification, the Long-Run and The Estimation 
of Transformed Regression Models’, Economic Journal, Vol. 98, No. 390, pp. 189–205. 
 
    
  
 29
Appendix I 
The Macroeconomic model* 
1.  Domestic prices 
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ϕ 1 = +P Y P YPY
P P M M   and ϕ 3 = +
P Y
P Y P Y
P P
P P M M
 
ED Y Yi i i= /  
 
1.1 Primary prices 
Δ Δ Δln . . ln . ln . ln ( ) ln ( ) .
( . )
.
* *
*
[ ]P e P ED P e P D
D
P f P P P f p= + + − − − − +
−
+
0 06 0 52 019 0 40 1 1 012 72
589
012 98
d i b g d i
            (5.92)  (10.23)             (1.96)                                                      (3.08)
          
            (3.08)
* * ** *
*
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.82, SEE = 0.04, DW = 1.71, DF = -4.76, ARCH – χ2(1) = 0.20, LM1 – F(1, 25) = 
0.11, RESET – F(1, 25) = 0.60, NORM – χ2(2) = 1.88 
Wald test for joint coefficient equality test for ef and PP
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* ** * ** **
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d i b g b g b g
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Adjusted R2 = 0.82, SEE = 0.02, DW =1.70, DF = -4.64, ARCH – χ2(1) = 0.52, LM1 – F(1, 22) = 
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* T ratios of regression coefficients are given in parentheses, with statistical significance 
defined as – * 1 per cent, ** 5 per cent, *** 10 per cent and **** 15 per cent   
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1.4 Real exchange rates 
 
1.4.1  Internal RER 
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1.4.2  External RER 
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4.1.3 Nontradable consumption  
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4.3 Private budget constraint 
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$* /= ⋅ −100 1b g  
4.4.2 Government policy rule 
               T InD InD InF InFG t G t
B
G t G t
B= − − −, , , ,c h c h  
 
4.5 Exports 
      P X e P X e P X OTHX I X P P I X M M X= + +,$ ,$  
 
4.5.1 Primary exports 
   
Δ Δ Δln . . ln ( ) . ln / . ln ( ) ln ( ) ln /
.
* *X Y e P P X Y e P P
D T
P P f p P P P f p P= + − + − − − −
+
442 064 1 022 048 1 1
0 83 0016
c h c h+ 0.52 (-1)
              (3.69)  (1.84)                 (1.01)                    (-3.66)                                    (1.32)
             - .25
              (-2.31)     (3.23)
* * **** * ***
** **
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.60, SEE = 0.10, DW = 1.98, DF = -5.49, ARCH – χ2(1) = 0.87, LM1 – F(1, 
24) = 1.21, RESET – F(1, 24) = 1.68, NORM – χ2(2) = 0.71 
Wald test for the long-run unit-capacity homogeneity – χ 2 1( )  = 0.40 (p-value = 0.52) 
 
4.5.2 Manufacturing exports 
   
Δ Δ Δln . . ln . ln / . ln ( ) ln ( ) . ln / ( )
. . .
* *X Y e P P X Y e P P
D D T
M M f M M M M f M M= + + − − − − + −
− − +
273 131 030 027 1 1 035 1
035 75 024 96 002
c h c h
              (4.04) (3.54)          (1.03)                        (-3.71)                                     (1.46)            
             
               (-3.35)     (-2.28)      (2.58)
* * **** * ***
* * *
     
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.67, SEE = 0.09, DW = 1.68, DF = -4.56, ARCH – χ2(1) = 0.14, LM1 – F(1, 
23) = 1.74, RESET –  F(1, 23) = 0.27, NORM – χ2(2) = 0.28 
Wald test for the long-run unit-capacity homogeneity –χ 2 1( )  = 4.11 (p-value = 0.05) 
 
4.6 Imports 
      P IM e P IM e P IM OTHIM IM P P IM M M IMI I= + +,$ ,$  
4.6.1 Primary Imports 
                
( )$ ,
**** ** ** *** ****
ln 1.36  1.18 ln 0.42 ln / 0.16 ln ( 1) 0.15ln ( 1)
                (-1.27) (2.36)       (-2.25)                          (-1.60)                (1.24)            
       
P I IM p P PIM Y e P P IM Y⎡ ⎤Δ = − + Δ − Δ − − + −⎣ ⎦
( )$ ,
**** ** *
        0.11ln / (-1)-0.29 73 0.44 86
                 (-1.15)                         (-2.25)     (-3.62)                        
I IM p Pe P P D D⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
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Adjusted R2 = 0.62, SEE = 0.11, DW = 1.91, DF = -5.12, ARCH – χ2(1) = 0.04, LM1 – F(1, 
23) = 2.87, RESET – F(1, 23) = 0.57, NORM – χ2(2) = 0.08 
 
4.6.2  Manufacturing Imports 
                
( )$ ,
* * * * *
ln 6.31 1.52 ln 0.78 ln / 0.40ln ( 1) 0.64ln ( 1)
                 (-2.79) (2.52)         (-3.12)                            (-3.44)                   (3.51)
                0.28l
M I IM M M MIM Y e P P IM Y⎡ ⎤Δ = − + Δ − Δ − − + −⎣ ⎦
− ( )$ ,
** *
n / (-1)-0.27D8285
                   (-1.85)                             (-3.12)
I IM M Me P P⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.71, SEE = 0.08, DW = 2.12, DF = -5.83, ARCH – χ2(1) = 4.35, LM1 – F(1, 
24) = 2.31, RESET – F(1, 24) = 2.46, NORM – χ2(2) = 0.35 
 
5. Money market 
 
5.1 Money supply 
      
Δ Δ ΔM eR CBCP M eR CBCP
CBCPU D
2 23127 314 164 0 36 1 120 1 124 1
0 65 1 533 68 9802
= + + − − + − + −
+ − −
. . . . ( ) . ( ) . ( )
. ( ) .
$ $  
          (2.27)    (7.95)         (8.07)           (-4.07)           (8.94)               (6.84)  
         
           (2.62)                     (-5.92)            
** * * * * *
* *
c h c h
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.88, SEE = 57.06, DW = 1.64, DF = -4.65, ARCH – χ2(1) = 0.01, LM1 – F(1, 23) 
= 1.19, RESET – F(1, 23) = 0.46, NORM – χ2(2) = 1.97 
 
5.2 Money Demand 
      
Δ Δ Δ Δln / . . ln / ( ) . ln / . ln . ln / ( )
ln ( ) . ln / ( ) . . .
M P M P in Y M P
Y in D D D
2 2 20 05 0 24 1 101 1 100 037 0 06 1
1 035 1 100 1 0 09 7374 0 07 8284 0 08 97
b g b g b g b g
b g
= + − − + + − −
− − − + − − + +
                      (3.26) (2.11)                        (-2.63)                           (2.51)         (-3.43)
                      
                                          (-1.60)                           (-4.07)           (3.65)          (2.55)
* ** * * *
*** * * *
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.70, SEE = 0.03, DW = 1.71, DF = -4.52, ARCH – χ2(1) = 1.24, LM1 – F(1, 22) = 
0.41, RESET – F(1, 22) = 0.12, NORM – χ2(2) = 0.52 
Wald test for the long-run unit-income homogeneity –χ 2 1( )  = 0.03 (p-value = 0.87) 
 
5.3 Private domestic credit 
      Δ Δ Δ ΔPDC M e R ClaimG OTHM= − + +2 2( )$  
 
6. External sector 
 
6.1  Current account 
      CA e P X P X P IMT P IMT i e F F OTHCAI X P P X M M P
WIM
P M
WIM
M P t G t= ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + +− −,$ ,$ * ,$ ,$/c h c h c h100 1 1  
 
6.2  Capital account 
      CAP e F FP G= − +Δ Δ$ $c h  
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     − = +ΔF FDI OCFP$ $ $  
 
       
Δ Δ Δ ΔOCF in i Y Y OCF
in i D D
W$ * $
*
. . . ln ( ) . ln ( ) . ( )
. ( ) . .
= − + − + − − − − −
+ − − + −
2 09 0 37 40 56 1 24 90 1 0 47 1
0 49 1 10 58 95 18 05 9798
  
                (-1.50) (1.39)             (2.38)               (-1.06)                (-5.64)                        
                 
                   (2.03)                   (4.68)       (-9.95)
*** *** ** **** *
** * *
c h
c h
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.87, SEE = 2.15, DW = 2.31, DF = -6.20, ARCH – χ2(1) = 4.01, LM1 – F(1, 22) = 
2.04, RESET – F(1, 22) = 3.01, NORM – χ2(2) = 1.54 
 
6.3 Balance of payments 
e R CA CAP OTHBPΔ $ = + +  
 
e e US
Japan
US
Singapore
US
Malaysia
US
China
US
Taiwan
US
Germany
US
Hong Kong
US
Korea
US
UK
US
Netherland
US
Australia
f I= LNM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
L
NM
O
QP
0 28 0 10 0 06 0 06 0 05 0 05
0 05 0 04 0 03 0 03 0 03
. . . . . .
. . . . .
           
 
 
 
7 Labour market 
L L L LP M N= + +    
U LF L
LF
= −FHG
I
KJ ⋅100  
 
7.1 Primary employment 
      
Δ Δ Δln . . ln . ln / . ln ( ) ln / / ( ) .
.
,L Y W P L Y W P D
D
P P P P P L P P P P= + − − − − − −
−
060 011 053 008 1 1 016 74
014 83
   
             (1.25)  (1.04)       (-6.92)                   (-1.46)                                                        (-2.87)     
           
            (-2.54)
**** **** * *** *
*
b g b g b gα
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.73, SEE = 0.08, DW = 2.09, DF = -6.63, ARCH – χ2(1) = 0.13, LM1 – F(1,25) = 
1.54, RESET – F(1, 25) = 0.001, NORM – χ2(2) = 1.36, α L P,  = 0.33 
 
7.2 Manufacturing employment 
      
Δ Δ Δln . . ln . ln / . ln ( ) ln / / ( ),L Y W P L Y W PM M M M M L M M M M= + − − − − −023 086 090 003 1 1  
              (2.00)  (6.41)             (-10.92)                  (-1.80)                                  ** * * **
b g b g b gα  
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.93, SEE = 0.04, DW = 1.99, DF = -4.30, ARCH – χ2(1) = 2.54, LM1 – F(1,27) = 
3.90, RESET – F(1, 27) = 3.03, NORM – χ2(2) = 0.93, α L M,  = 0.19 
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7.3 Nontradable employment 
      
Δ Δ Δln . . ln . ln / . ln ( ) ln / / ( )
.
,L Y W P L Y W P
D
N N N N N L N N N N= + − − − − −
−
031 057 079 005 1 1
006 7374
  
             (2.32)  (4.94)             (-15.22)                 (-2.11)                                             
              
             (-2.72)           
** * * **
*
b g b g b gα
 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.89, SEE = 0.03, DW = 1.73, DF = -4.72, ARCH – χ2(1) = 0.004, LM1 – F(1,26) 
= 1.19, RESET – F(1, 26) = 0.38, NORM – χ2(2) = 4.11, α L N, = 0.54 
 
8 Other related prices 
       ln ln ln ( ) lnP P P PC P M N= + + − −γ γ γ γ1 2 1 21  
       γ 1 = + +
P C
P C P C P C
P P
P P M M N N
,  γ 2 = + +
P C
P C P C P C
M M
P P M M N N
 
       ln ln ln ( ) lnP P P PI P M N= + + − −γ γ γ γ3 4 3 41  
                  γ 3 = + +
P I
P I P I P I
P P
P P M M N N
,  γ 4 = + +
P I
P I P I P I
M M
P P M M N N
 
       ln ln ln ( ) lnP P P PG P M N= + + − −γ γ γ γ5 6 5 61  
       γ 5 = + + +
P GI
P GI P GI P GI GC
P P
P P M M N N( )
,  γ 6 = + + +
P GI
P GI P GI P GI GC
M M
P P M M N N( )
 
       ln ln ( ) ln,
$
,
$P e P e PX I X P I X M= + −γ γ7 71  
                     γ 7 = ⋅ + ⋅
e P X
e X P X P
I X P P
I P X P M X M
,
$
,
$
,
$
 
       ln ln ln,
$
,
$P e P e PIM I IM P I IM M= + −γ γ9 91  
        γ 9 = ⋅ + ⋅
e P IMT
e IMT P IMT P
I IM P P
I P IM P M IM M
,
$
,
$
,
$
 
 
 
Lists of Variables 
Exogenous Variables 
CBCP   Central bank credit to the private sector (billion baht) 
CBCPU  Central bank credit to the public sector (billion baht) 
ClaimG  Government domestic credit (billion baht) 
DEPEND  Ratio of dependent to non-dependent population 
e   Nominal exchange rate (Baht to the US dollar) 
eI   Index of nominal exchange rate (e/25.29) (1988 = 1) 
ef   Nominal effective exchange rate (domestic to foreign currencies) (1988 = 1) 
FDI $   Foreign direct investment (billions of US dollars) 
GIi   Real government investment in the i
th sector (billion baht) 
GC   Real government consumption (billion baht) 
i*  World interest rate (US prime rate) (per cent) 
iG   Government bond yield rate (per cent) 
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InDG   Interest payment for domestic borrowing of the public sector (billion baht) 
InFG
B   Interest receipts from foreign assets held by the public sector at the historical base 
InDG
B   Interest payment for domestic borrowing of the public sector at the historical base 
la   Land (hectare) 
LPi   Labour efficiency in the ith sector (real value added per worker) 
LF   Labour force (thousand) 
MW   Minimum wage (baht per person) 
P*   Tariff-ridden world prices (1988 = 1) 
Pp
*   Tariff-ridden world primary prices (1988 = 1) 
PM
*   Tariff-ridden world manufacturing prices (1988 = 1)   
PIMR
*   Import prices of raw materials (1988 = 1) 
PIM P,
$   Import prices of primary goods (1988 = 1) 
PIM M,
$   Import prices of manufactured goods (1988 = 1) 
PX P,
$   Export prices of primary goods (1988 = 1) 
PX M,
$   Export prices of manufactured goods (1988 = 1) 
T   Time trend 
TFPi   Trend of total factor productivity in the ith sector 
U *   Natural rate of unemployment (= 2.73 per cent) 
YW   World income (1988 = 1) 
δ i   Depreciation rate in the ith sector  
 
Endogenous Variables 
ASSET  Total real private assets (billion baht) 
EDi   Excess demand in the ith sector (output gap) 
C   Total real private consumption (billion baht) 
Ci   Real private consumption in the i
th sector (billion baht) 
CA   Current Account (billion baht) 
CAP   Capital account (billion baht) 
CKi   Cost of capital in the i
th sector  
FP
$   Stock of foreign (capital) assets held by private sector (billions of US dollars) 
FG
$     Stock of foreign (capital) assets held by public sector (billions of US dollars) 
in   Domestic lending interest rate (per cent) 
I   Total real private investment (billion baht) 
Ii   Real private investment in the i
th sector (billion baht) 
IM   Total real imports (billion baht) 
IMi   Real goods imports in the i
th sector (billion baht) 
InFG   Interest receipts from foreign assets held by the public sector (billion baht) 
Ki   Net capital stock in the i
th sector (billion baht) 
L   Total employment (thousand) 
Li   Employment in the ith sector (thousand) 
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Li   Labour force adjusted by natural rate of unemployment in the ith sector (thousand) 
M2  Board money M2 (billion baht) 
OCF $   Other form of capital flows (billions of US dollars) 
P   Domestic output price (1988 = 1) 
PT   Tradable prices (1988 = 1) 
PN   Nontradable prices (1988 = 1) 
PP   Primary prices (1988 = 1) 
PM   Manufacturing prices (1988 = 1) 
PC   Implicit price deflator of consumption (1988 = 1) 
PI   Implicit price deflator of investment (1988 = 1) 
PG   Implicit price deflator of government (1988 = 1) 
PX   Implicit price deflator of exports (1988 = 1) 
PIM   Implicit price deflator of imports (1988 = 1) 
PDC   Stock of private domestic credit (flows = ΔPDC ) (billion baht) 
R$   Stock of foreign exchange reserves (billions of US dollars)  
RER   Real exchange rate (1988 = 100) 
TP   Total tax (billion baht) 
T   Lump-sum tax for policy simulation 
U   Unemployment rate (per cent) 
UNCER  Economic uncertainty 
Wi   Nominal wages in the i
th sector (baht per person) 
X   Total real exports (billion baht) 
Xi   Real goods exports in the i
th sector (billion baht) 
Y   Real GDP (billion baht) 
Yi   Real GDP in the ith sector (billion baht) 
Y d   Real disposable income (billion baht) 
Y   Total real potential output (billion baht) 
Yi   Real potential output in the i
th sector (billion baht) 
 
 
Note:   1.  A separation of output (gross domestic product, GDP at constant (1988) prices) and its components into 
primary, manufacturing and nontradable sectors is based on the International Standard of Industrial Classification 
(ISIC).  The output in primary sector ( YP ) consists of agricultural, mining, and quarrying (ISIC 01, 02, 05, and 10-14).  
Manufacturing output (YM) covers all production activities classified under ISIC 15 -37.  Nontradables ( YN ) covers the 
remaining items of national accounts.  The same classification is applied in disaggregating the components of aggregate 
demand. 
2.  The tariff-ridden world price of primary goods ( PP
* ) expressed in foreign currency is obtained as the 
weighted average of seven world commodity prices, namely rice, rubber, tapioca, shrimp, maize, cotton, and tin.  The 
tariff-ridden world price of manufactured goods ( PM
* ) expressed in foreign currency is obtained as the weighted 
average of manufacturing producer prices for Thailand’s main trading partners.  The tariff-ridden imported raw 
materials price ( PIMR
* ) is measured by the import price index (excluding prices of food and beverages, and animal and 
vegetable oil).  Import duty rates on primary and manufactured products are measured by the ratio of total duty 
collection to value of import.  
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Appendix II 
The model performance 
 
1.  Measures of the prediction accuracy of the model, 1977-2002 
Proportion Variables MAPE Theil 
Bias Variance Covariance 
Internal RER ( RERInternal ) 2.35 0.01 0.219 0.000 0.780 
External RER ( RERExternal ) 1.62 0.01 0.078 0.043 0.879 
Tradable price (PT ) 1.65 0.01 0.028 0.291 0.681 
Primary price ( PP ) 4.36 0.02 0.039 0.049 0.911 
Manufacturing price ( PM ) 1.66 0.01 0.112 0.150 0.738 
Nontradable price ( PN ) 2.54 0.01 0.380 0.043 0.577 
GDP deflator ( P ) 1.91 0.01 0.417 0.084 0.499 
Consumption deflator ( PC ) 1.53 0.01 0.233 0.148 0.619 
Primary wage (WP ) 9.99 0.08 0.043 0.046 0.911 
Manufacturing wage (WM ) 14.83 0.10 0.151 0.261 0.587 
Nontradable wage (WN ) 3.40 0.02 0.031 0.065 0.904 
Real GDP (Y ) 5.22 0.03 0.123 0.385 0.492 
Primary output (YP ) 9.06 0.06 0.054 0.089 0.857 
Manufacturing output ( YM ) 9.96 0.05 0.009 0.497 0.494 
Nontradable output ( YN ) 4.20 0.03 0.140 0.311 0.549 
Private consumption ( C ) 5.03 0.03 0.066 0.375 0.559 
Private investment ( I ) 10.25 0.09 0.144 0.339 0.516 
Export ( X ) 5.24 0.02 0.058 0.380 0.562 
Import ( IMT ) 6.69 0.06 0.271 0.298 0.431 
Broad money ( M2 ) 26.24 0.09 0.062 0.362 0.577 
Domestic interest rate ( in ) 8.91 0.05 0.344 0.001 0.655 
Total employment ( L ) 2.91 0.02 0.006 0.225 0.769 
Source:  Author’s calculation. 
 
2. Diagnostic simulations 
 
Figure 2.1:  Effects of Permanent Increase in Government Consumption, 1977-2002 
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Figure 2.2:  Effects of Permanent Increase in Technological Progress in the Tradable  
                          (Primary and Manufacturing) Sector, 1977-2002 
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Figure 2.3:  Effects of One Per Cent Nominal Exchange Rate Devaluation, 1977-2002 
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